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Abstract The aim of this paper  is to investigate the impact of fiscal decen- 
tralization on the size of regional  governments in Spain, by controlling for 
economies  of scale, interregional heterogeneity and institutional framework. 
We  study  it over  1985 to  2004 using  a panel  dataset of seventeen spanish 
regions.  The results  can be easily summarized. Firstly, it supports the classic 
public goods theory  of a trade-off-between the economic  benefits  of size and 
the costs of heterogeneity. Secondly, it doesn’t reject the “Leviathan” hypoth- 
esis and  neither does  the  “common pool”  hypothesis.  Thirdly,  by contrast, 
the  paper  partly  rejects  the  “Wallis”’  hypothesis. It argues  that  government 
size is mediated by financial  resources obtained through intergovernmental 
grants,  consistent with  welfare  economics   and  positive  economic   policies. 
We  conclude   that  later  advances   in  the  decentralisation process  must  be 
compatible with the goal of reducing  fiscal imbalances  that emanate from the 
vertical structure of fiscal power. 
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